other by a combination of perception and thought, which Jaspers called empathic understanding (Einfuehlendes V erstehen). This definition of understanding therefore became a method in a pure psychopathology. It emphasized that naive reasoning and perception had a unique role in illuminating human experience. Schneider's psychopathology is a pure science of understanding, a science which examines all descriptions of psychological states for fallacies, which concepts and models of thought borrowed from natural science may have created. Schneider (19) is critical of Bleuler's primary symptoms for two reasons. Firstly, because he does not cover all observed clinical conditions. Secondly, because his method of 'explaining' schizophrenia by primary processes was already faulty in principle because it applied the concepts of natural science to psychopathology such as mental mechanism, flow of thought, splitting, etc.
Biography in the context of this article has, according to Schneider, formal features. It reveals the evolution of the individual personality as it shows a coherent development which can be empathically understood by the observer as to its cohesion and unity. The psychotic process acts on the development and evolution of a personality producing a change which when compared with the prepsychotic personality is not comprehensible. The relationship between normal and psychotic is like the one between meaningful and senseless. The basis of this change from 'meaningful' to 'senseless' is considered to be brain disease in organic psychoses, or the endogenous process in schizophrenia and manic depressive illness.
Descriptive science such as psychiatry thrives on collecting and comparing facts, and in referring to Jaspers' and Schnei- 209 Ever since descriptive psychiatry postulated the working hypothesis of the dichotomy of the endogenous psychoses, some schools of thought have opposed it because they assumed that there were additional categories (8, 9, 15) , others because they felt Kraepelin's (oncept of the natural history of mental diseases did injustice to the unique development of the individual personality.
Descriptive psychiatrists argue that a psychiatric system of diseases within the framework of clinical medicine, using concepts like diagnosis, prognosis, remission, etc., becomes meaningless when emphasis is predominantly given to certain traumatic events in the history of the mentally diseased person. Quite apart from the task of classification of all mental diseases several questions have to be asked:
What can be understood in a psychic phenomenon? What is understanding? What is the evidence we use in order to make the connection between psychic phenomena convincing? These issues were formulated and analyzed in Jasper's book General Psychopathology. His main contention was that there is a fundamental difference between understanding psychic processes by themselves on the one hand, and explaining psychic phenomena by corresponding neuroanatomical findings. Explaining as to cause and effect was recognized as a law in natural science and was used by Jaspers in the description of all organic psychoses, (i.e. dementia and personality change being caused by their physical substrate in the brain). On the other hand, psychological events can only meaningfully be related to each Vol. 14, No.2 der's method of pure psychopathology the psychiatrist analyzes psychological events personality traits and developments 'by thesam~met?0d as a historian or a Weberian sociologist analyzes events in time, apart from~tudy.ing psychol~ gical changes in relationship to anatomical substrates. In other words, clinical psychiatry has two pillars on which it rests. Firstly, natural science, which gives us some meagre, yet significant knowledge about causes of some mental abnormality (example, phenylketonuria). Secondly, historical science (pure psychopathology) which analyzes biographical data as to their coherence and unity within an individual case history. In a convincing number of cases psychotic phenomena do not mea.ningfully alig:n themselves with any particular traumanc psychological experience, i.e. t?ey emanate, at least to some extent, in an unmotivated manner. If we compare the psychological picture of the psychosis with the individual's life development, we may conclude th~t it shat~ers the cohesion and destroys ItS meamngful continuity. Generally speaking accordi?g to Schneider (20) one cannot make inferences as to the course any illness will follow on the basis of psychopathological symptoms alone. Kraepelin's classification showed that there are roughly two types of diseases, those which have a natural tendency to remit completely, and those whose psychopathology becomes systematized and chronically irreversible. For the sake of completeness it is necessary to refer to the idea of the Einheits psychosis (10) and the frame of reference which does justice to the great varietv of disease entities which are supposedro be different, not only in their psychopathology and cour~e, but also in heredity. However, we SImply accept the above mentioned hypothesis of the dichotomy of the psychoses. Aside from accumulated factual evidence this dichotomy is supported by Schneider's method of pure psychopathology which has extensively studied, as we will see, the experience of the schizophrenic and the manic depressive patient.
We now have arrived at the question: How do we make a diagnosis? What is a symptom?
From the medical point of view a symptom means an indicator or a verifiable proof of an illness. Organi~de:nentia points towards structural brain disease or defect, papilledema with depression points towards a brain tumor, and 'Argyll Robertson's pupils' together with poorly articulated speech points towards general paresis of the insane. The appearance of a delusion is a symptom of an unknown and only theoretically postulated disease. A delusion might not even be a symptom of an illness. The line between delusion and human error and ignorance is not well marked. Bizarre speech and behaviour is not a sign of schizophrenia; it merely fits into the schizophrenic picture when other signs like poor rapport and contact are present -otherwise bizarreness is a product of cultural prejudice. In medicine certain s0l1!atic pa~ho logical processes produce verifiable SIgns and changes which are called symptoms. However, it would be wiser in psychopathology to understand by the. t~rm symptoms, some general characteristics: a constant feature of a purely psychopathological nature that can be correlated with others into an existing state and a subsequent course entity which is called diagnosis. The token sign or characteristic feature is therefore still a clinical concept referring to a psychopathologically constructed state and cour~e entity, e.g. schizophrenia (20) . By this definition we have established an analogy between a true medical symptom and a symptom being a sign or a trait or a characteristic of a psychosis with certain reservations. The psychiatric symptom never permits clear foregone conclusions about the significance of a certain illness as it does in the case of Arg-yll Robertson's sign, but it is used for labelling, as being characteristic for a certain type of psychosis. Thought diffusion or expropriation of thought is only called a symptom of schizophrenia if we do not find an organic brain change suggesting that the patient suffers from epilepsy or from general paresis of the insane. Though these symptoms are frequently observed phenomena in schizophrenia, they have been observed in epilepsy (13) and G.P.I. (20, 19) but not in any other psychosis.
Clinical observation and description always tried to establish a relationship between different symptoms; it tries to establish a hierarchy of symptoms. Several propositions for the classification of symptoms were formulated by Schneider:
PROPOSITION NO.1: The primary symptom precedes the secondary symptom in time. This applies to expressions like secondary dementia after acute brain disease. The relationship between both symptoms categories is purely temporal.
PROPOSITION NO.2:
Primary symptoms are those which are observed persistently in a psychiatric disease entity. As such we have to understand Bleuler's primary symptoms of schizophrenia. In his text book he outlines these: disturbances of the flow of thought, changes in the affectivity and autism. Bleuler's theory of schizophrenia can only be comprehended within the theoretical framework of associative psychology. It contends that the flow of thought becomes incoherent and concepts anchored in Aristotelian logic become dissolved, the expression of emotion becomes split from its apparent content. This splitting up of the continuity, not only of thought, but of thought from other psychic phenomena is considered to be the primary symptom of schizophrenia. There are some contradictions. Bleuler maintains that this discontinuity does not have to be apparent to give justification for the diagnosis of schizophrenia, but he maintains that it truly becomes apparent in the later stages of the illness.
No matter how convincing Bleuler's theory may be, many cases out of the great variety of schizophrenic states do not fit into it without straining the clinical facts. How can we explain this theory and this phenomenon of incoherence to a third year resident in psychiatry who desperately tried for one hour to find incoherence of thought in a verbose paraphrenic?
As to the manic depressive illness, sadness and morbid gaiety cannot be considered to be ever-present because other symptoms like agitation, worriement and anxiety may be pre-eminent though they are not characteristic.
Sadness and inhibition are more often seen in combination than sadness and agitation though the depression of older people is marked by a higher incidence of the latter symptomatology. The subjective experience of sinfulness, hypochondriasis and fear of loss of material security give the principal contents of the delusional 'choice' of the depressed person. The endogenous depression therefore from the anthropological point of view uncovers three principal concerns of the human condition in general: the concern over the integrity of the soul, the body and the security of the environment. The choice of the theme of a depressive delusion is certainly influenced by psychodynamic factors, which is why the delusional choice cannot be considered to be a primary symptom. Since the three concerns mentioned above represent pre-existing human anxieties and fears, we can say that these anxieties are unmasked by a psychotic depression but they are not positively produced by it. Another basic, and what one could consider an ever-present symptom of an endogenous depression is the stability of the depressive illness as to its environment. Depression or morbid gaiety are not influenced by intensive psychological disruptive experiences. This is quite in contrast to schizophrenic states in which patients ordinarily will react to eminent reality, a finding which has been amply studied in psychiatric wards during the First and Second World Wars. These symptoms make it clear that endogenous depressive sadness or agitation and manic gaiety have a special quality which make them distinctly different from reactive sadness and joy. This is supported by the frequent observation that a patient experiences the beginning and the end of his depressive psychosis as beginning spontaneously without any convincing relationship to environmental circumstances. Very frequently in melancholia loss of vitality and vivaciousness is a complaint. Sadness does not have to manifest itself only in the psychological or spiritual sphere. Sadness, very clearly, can be localized in the body, predominantly in the chest. There is a certain heaviness of grief, a weight on the chest which can be experienced as pain and physical discomfort exclusively.
Loss of vivaciousness and vitality at one time was considered by Schneider to be a primary symptom but on the other hand anxiety-ridden worry can be the only psychopathological feature in many cases, and one would have to strain the facts to make this worriement an outcome of underlying loss of vitality. One could sometimes cautiously formulate that the rich variety of traits and symptoms in the depressive or manic patient is a psychic reaction to a diminished or enriched sense of vitality which one could very well then consider to be a primary symptom. Naturally, this statement would lead us to Proposition No.3.
Retardation as a primary symptom of depression is invalid, simply because it may not be present in all depressions, and it may be a symptom of schizophrenia (18, 17) .
Though Payne (18) originally tried to elaborate tests to correlate psychomotor retardation with Cameron's over-inclusion (i,e, inability to distinguish the essential from the unimportant), he came to the conclusion later that psychomotor retardation and over-inclusion are not identical and are not caused by the same disturbances.
Payne's (17), Bannister's (1, 2) and Chapman's (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12) investigation produced some evidence in favour of dividing schizophrenia into two subgroups: those with measurable thought disorder and those with no typical responses to his test batteries. Thought disorder seems to be most severe in those cases which have strongly affect-laden delusional formations. Leonhard (15) calls them unsystematic schizophrenia. According to Chapman (7, 11) , unsystematic schizophrenias respond better to neuroleptics, but it has to be taken into consideration that these types of psychoses have a good prognosis as to their natural outcome anyway.
PROPOSITION NO.3:
Primary symptoms are caused by the disease process (for instance associative disturbance in schizophrenia) and the clinical picture itself with all its accessory symptoms (hallucinations, bizarre behaviour, thought hearing, delusions, depressive irritability) is a secondary elaboration and an artefact, a product of the response of the organism to the psychotic primary process. Age, intelligence, childhood development, personality type, constitutional type have to be mentioned as contributing to the colour of the psychopathological state. Bleuler left the question entirely open whether the primary process in schizophrenia has a somatic substrate or whether it is purely psychological in nature. But here the primary symptoms are the 'cause' of everything else. It also means that the secondary symptoms are psychological functions under different conditions. They are, to some extent, manifestations of a more or less successful, yet inadequate, attempt of the diseased personality to adjust to the primary changes of thought. This concept is already discarded by the advent of the ego psychology of Federn who looks at accessory symptoms as an outcome of ego impairment (21) . This train of thought is entirely different from the early position of Freud and Bleuler which is roughly outlined by the statement: "The neurosis does not deny reality, it ignores it; the psychosis denies it and tries to replace it by a new reality." Sometimes a delusion may represent a fulfilment of a desire yet it is absurd to assume that a delusion originates just because of that. It would be just as absurd to assume that we sleep in order to dream. A patient does not have a delusion because of unfulfilled desire, but he may fulfil this desire when he develops a psychosis or when he dreams.
As to age, we can say that it brings about a reaction to the recurrence of the disease process, particularly in the manic depressive patient who suffers from recurrent depressions. It modifies the psychopathology of the separate depressive phases. Different phases of depression in the lifetime of a patient can have different symptoms. There is a certain law which Matussek (16) recently demonstrated: If we term all symptoms which are exclusively experienced in the psychological sphere (e.g. guilt, worry and suicidal ideas) ego-syntonic, irrespective of whether agitation or inhibition is associated with them and if we call all hypochondriacal complaints (e.g. feelings of heaviness on the chest, abdominal discomfort, and bowel preoccupation) egoalien, then we can observe a shift from ego-syntone to ego alien in the course of several depressive phases in the lifetime of a patient. The patient after several depressive phases seems to lean more towards the idea of suffering from physical illness. This also explains why so many patients who frequently suffer from depressions are less likely to report a precipitating event in their illnesses.
This article does not defend the untenable position that disease entities arise with the absence of a psychological relationship with the pre-psychotic personality development but the purpose is to attempt to clarify concepts of a philosophy which undoubtedly is still used by most psychiatric consultants. Nobody would maintain that the word 'endogenous' divests us from all responsibility to consider other factors in the shaping and colouring of the psychopathological picture. We can say that there is an interplay between constitutional factors, inheritance and environment. It is naturally the opinion of the author of this article that in psychotic illness, a new. factor (endogenous) introduces itself and causes symptoms which may not only be abnormally intensified as to their content, but also represent formal alterations of the psyche.
Since the pre-depressive personality tries to achieve and master life in a competitive world, frictions in occupation or profession are mo:e. of~en seen by t~e patient as the preclpltatmg causes of~IS psychosis. Love for the.spouse and. children in the pre-depressive person IS regarded as an achievement attained by conscientious endeavour. For him there may have been many achievements but his high aspirations were never really satisfied. Love is not perceived as an essential and unquestioned experience. It is not experienced as an approval but as an accomplishment of a task in which the depressed or predepressed person is gaining love from the partner. We can recognize that this disposition can lead to a depressive disaster. We do not see it all the time, but it lets us understand why in women for instance, there is a high incidence of depressive illness in an age when the children are grown up and about to leave home. The dependency of the growing children is a task which is not easily given up or tolerantly terminated when they start to develop their own style of life. The change from looking after the young to accepting them as equals is not accomplished by a person whose worrisome conscientiousness suffers from their independent spontaneity, which is rebelling against control.
Hence, there are some understandable connections between schizophrenia and the depressive psychosis on the one hand and the prepsychotic personality on the other. There is generally more similarity between the different pictures of the manic depressive psychosis than is the case in schizophrenia. This makes us believe that in spite of variety they might belong to one morbid entity -something one cannot find in the group of schizophrenias, and it should be emphasized that this also remains valid when we study the relationship between the prepsychotic personality and the schizophrenic symptoms themselves.
If we follow manic depressives to their senium a certain percentage develop schizophrenic-like psychoses. If we follow schizophrenics to their late age, particularly in reference to delusional formations, several developments can be seen:
Firstly, the schizophrenic patients become less preoccupied with their abnormal psychological experiences. They are calmer and more composed.
Secondly, the delusions become dissolved but the patient becomes more deteriorated.
Thirdly, the patient has a greater tendency to see his delusions and his delusional experiences as being harmless. The delusion becomes more encapsulated, rigid and less given to the problems created by his aggressive drives.
Fourthly, sometimes paranoid preoccupations develop a depressive colour.
Fifthly, the delusion changes and adjusts to the general life situation.
Sixthly, sometimes it can occur that there is a great deal of further elaboration and generalization of the original delusional ideas held for many years.
Generally speaking old schizophrenics have no ability to produce new delusions. Most probably this is explained by the loss of the creative ability in the senium. New delusions could only be formed if genuine somatic changes due to age were delusionally elaborated on; for instance, atrophic skin lesions and paresthesias can be changed into zoophobic delusions in senile schizophrenics. These changes make schizophrenics beyond their fifties socially more pliable. Many of them after this age establish a better contact, have a better rapport, and become more sociable. Hence, only a brief word about both psychoses. Manic depressive illness does not always have the good outcome given to it by definition (16) . According to some authors, in twenty-five per cent of all cases, very frequent manic depressive episodes in a life-time lead to chronic symptoms like lack of contact and chronic depressive hypochondriacal traits with loss of persistency and endurance. These pictures sometimes may be quite similar to that presented by patients suffering from schizophrenia simplex. The primary symptom in both is evaporation of drive and energy. It is probably not correct to say that all final stages of schizophrenia have a typical 'schizophrenic' colour. This specific colour described by some, is loss of contact, emotional blunting, isolation, withdrawal; by others, with cool distance and so on, can be absent. In those cases a defect syndrome presents itself, not dissimilar to a chronic organic brain syndrome, with lack of drive and vitality, loss of purposefullness, low frustration tolerance, inclination to irritability, impulsive acting out, and reduction of responsiveness towards others. It is Huber's (14) opinion that the pure psychasthenic defect states of schizophrenia after a duration of an illness for twenty or thirty years was never properly evaluated. This author originally had the idea that the type of schizophrenia which is associated in a large proportion of cases with brain atrophy belonged to a special category. In a recent article, he emphasizes that this end state can occur in any type of schizophrenia (catatonic, paranoid, hebephrenic or simplex), but it is to his merit that he found an unusual prevalence of brain atrophy in those schizophrenics who showed a marked inclination towards hypochondriasis, asthenic insufficiency and loss of vitality. Old catatonic schizophrenics may show the syndrome of complete lack of spontaneity. Psychic activity and planning is clearly absent, but the patient reacts to prodding. He will participate passively when pushed, but he stops moving immediately when stimulation from the outside ceases. This is neither stupor nor negativism nor katalepsia but these conditions are observed in patients with frontal tumors, frontal injuries and affections of the diencephalon of a neoplastic and inflammatory nature.
It is not presumptuous to ask whether modem pharmacotherapy and E.C.T. may not produce a larger number of chose pure defect states which in their pathology cannot easily be distinguished from chronic organic brain syndromes.
PROPOSITION NO.4:
If all propositions presented above are derived from the basic assumption that physiological or structural brain damage causes an intellectual deficit in time or the symptoms of mental illness can be explained by a theoretically postulated disease process, then we cannot avoid asking for an enumeration of certain symptoms which are most typical for a certain illness, resorting only to describing them with simple language and demanding at the same time not to resort to any psychological theory. Schneider has done this for the group of schizophrenias. He calls those symptoms which are most typical for the diagnosis of schizophrenia, symptoms of the first degree. Whenever these first degree symptoms are observed with certainty, the diagnosis of schizophrenia can be made with one reservation -if there is no organic brain disease. These symptoms are not always present in schizophrenic states, but when they are present, they confirm the diagnosis. First degree symptoms appear in clear cons-ciousness in schizophrenia in the majority of cases of organic brain illness they appear in clouded states. Recently Janzarik (13) described a few cases of epilepsy having first degree symptoms in full consciousness.
The first degree symptoms are: First: audible thoughts Second: voices heard arguing Third: voices heard commenting on one's actions Fourth: the experience of influences playing on one's body (somatic passivity experiences) Fifth: thought withdrawal and other interferences with thought Sixth: diffusion of thought Seventh: delusional perception Eighth: all feelings, impulses, and volitional acts that are experienced by the patient as the work or influence of others. Schneider contends that symptoms of the first rank do not have to be present for diagnosis. If they are not present one has to resort to other phenomena like poor rapport and contact, inappropriate affect and so on. His proposition is better understood if one asks the question: What is atypical for the manic depressive illness? What symptoms do we use in order to separate a schizophrenic psychosis from a manic depressive one? According to Jaspers' empathic understanding, as formulated in the first pages of this paper, these schizophrenic first degree symptoms do not fit into the experience of a person suffering from a manic depressive illness. Schneider's position in psychopathological thought is based on Kraepelin's dichotomy and on Jaspers' descriptive phenomenology. In his clinical conference Schneider frequently used the terms schizophrenic and cyclothymic experiences. He was convinced that there were no transitional states between the two conditions. In other words, he delineated schizophrenia from the manic depressive illness by his first degree symptoms positively, but he has been very reluctant to do the same in reverse. The problem in describing a symptom of 'first degree importance' to the manic depressive illness has been amply evaluated under Proposition No.2.
Conclusion
This paper evaluates the term primary and secondary symptoms. The method of approach and classifying is based on Schneider's principles of conceptual descriptive psychiatry. It criticizes the Bleulerian theory of the group of schizophrenias without trying to replace it by a new classification based on a new psychological theory.
